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Pritchett: Pritchett: No Retrenchment in Affirmative Action:

NO RETRENCHMENT IN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
TENSION BETWEEN CIVIL RIGHTS

LAWS AND LAYOFFS
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts'

In 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act.2 The decision affirmed the right of employees to organize into unions which would provide them the opportunity to deal
more equally with their employers.3 In 1954, the Supreme Court rejected the
doctrine of separate but equal treatment for blacks. 4 The decision implicitly
recognized that blacks would remain second-class citizens unless blacks and
whites were integrated into a single society. 5 These watershed cases marked
the beginnings of the Court's increased concern for the rights of laborers and
the rights of blacks. In 1984, these twin concerns of the Court collided.
In FirefightersLocal Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,6 the Supreme Court de7
cided whether, to maintain a particular proportion of minority workers in the
8
labor force, the burden of job layoffs may fall upon senior nonminority em1. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
2. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
3. Id. at 33.,
4. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See id. at 494.
6. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
7. For convenience, the term "minority" will be applied generally to include
minority and female workers.
8. Basically, seniority is measured from the date on which an employee began
working with an employer. Elkiss, Modifying Seniority Systems Which Perpetuate
Past Discrimination, 31 LAB. L.J. 37, 37 (1980). Layoffs in a company following a
seniority system are conducted under a last-hired, first-fired rule, i.e., employees are
laid off in reverse order of seniority. Craft, Equal Opportunity and Seniority: Trends
and Manpower Implications, 26 LAB. L.J. 750, 752 (1975).
Seniority provides two types of benefits to an employee. Benefit seniority provides
employees with benefits which do not deprive other employees of similar benefits. Benefit seniority determines conditions of employment such as length of vacation, size of
pension, and rate of pay. By contrast, competitive seniority provides employees with
benefits which, when exercised, disadvantage other employees. For instance, competitive seniority gives an employee the right to retain her job while less senior employees
are laid off, the right to bump a less senior employee out of his position, and the right
to be recalled before a less senior employee. Ziskind, Affirmative Action v. Seniority,
Retroactive Seniority: A Remedy for Hiring Discrimination,27 LAB. L.J. 480, 484-85
(1976).
The size of the unit in which seniority may be exercised is also important. In a
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ployees rather than less senior minority employees who have been hired under
court approved affirmative action plans.9 The Court held that since Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 protects bona fide seniority systems, 1 it is
inappropriate for courts to interfere with such systems to prevent the layoff of
recently hired minority employees in order to maintain the gains of an affirmative action plan.' 2 Those minority employees who prove they have been actual
victims of discrimination may be awarded retroactive seniority and thus be
afforded so much relief from the layoffs as their constructive position on the
seniority roster gives them. However, members of a disadvantaged class, absent proof of discrimination against themselves individually, may not avail
plant-wide seniority system an employee's seniority provides him benefits with respect
to all other employees of the plant. In a departmental seniority system the employee's
seniority provides benefits only with respect to her particular department in the plant.
When an employee transfers to another department she loses all seniority earned in the
department from which she transferred. Craft, supra, at 750-51. Departmental seniority systems often work to the disadvantage of minority workers because they had often
been segregated into "black" or "Hispanic" or "female" departments before the effective date of equal employment opportunity legislation. Once given the opportunity to
transfer to the more desirable "white" or "male" departments, minorities would still be
disadvantaged because they would lose seniority earned in their old departments. Id.
Prior to Stotts, departmental seniority systems which had this effect on minorities had
been found to be unlawful. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (departmental seniority system enjoined and replaced
with plant-wide seniority system), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (departmental seniority system enjoined and replaced with plant-wide seniority system).
9. The Supreme Court addressed this issue for the first time in the Stotts
decision.
10. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides:
[lI]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system...
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
A bona fide seniority system is difficult to define. Determination of what seniority
systems are bona fide is made on a case-by-case basis. James v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 352 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
But several general characteristics indicate the nature of a bona fide seniority system.
A bona fide seniority system is one adopted without intent to discriminate. Stotts, 104
S. Ct. at 2587. A bona fide seniority system applies equally to all races and ethnic
groups. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 (1977). A
bona fide seniority system does not lose its bona fide status simply because it may
perpetuate past discrimination. See id. at 353-54. A union has argued that its seniority
system was bona fide "when judged in light of its history, intent, application and all of
the circumstances under which it was created and is maintained." Id. at 345. See id. at
355-56 for the Supreme Court's analysis of whether a particular seniority system was
bona fide.
11. 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
12. Id. at 2588.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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themselves of retroactive seniority.' 3
Some observers of this decision claim that it marks the beginning of a
turn away from race-conscious remedies and thus away from affirmative action.14 However, a more likely correct interpretation of the opinion is not that
the Court in Stotts turned away from affirmative action, but that it merely
followed the results of numerous lower court decisions by placing a boundary
upon the extent of affirmative action application.
In 1977, Stotts, a black firefighter in the Memphis Fire Department, filed
a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee. Stotts charged that the fire department violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against black employees in its hiring and promotion practices.' 5 Following discovery and settlement negotiations, the district court approved and entered a consent decree in 1980. Under
the terms of the decree, the city agreed to pursue a long-term goal of increasing black representation in the fire department to a proportion approximately
equal to that of blacks in the labor force of Shelby County.16 The city admit7
ted to no violations of the law in agreeing to the decree.'
The plaintiffs, on their part, agreed to seek no further relief other than to
enforce the decree. The employment goals outlined in this decree were consistent with the goals provided for in a 1974 consent decree to which the city had
agreed to resolve a suit brought against it by the United States. The 1974
decree provided that, for purposes of promotion, transfer, and assignment, seniority would be determined by each employee's total time with the city.
Neither decree dealt with the possibility of layoffs or reductions in rank.' 8
13. Id.
14. For example, William Bradford Reynolds, chief of the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice once stated that "civil rights was at a crossroads; that we
would either take the path of race conscious remedies . . . or the high road of race
neutrality." Seniority Determines Layoffs, Justices Rule, MONTHLY LAB. REv., August

1984, at 39. After the Stotts decision he said, "The court has moved us off the cross-

roads and propelled us down the road we have been urging." Id.; see also Campaign
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 182, 183 (1985); Powers, 'Stotts' Douses Courts' Affirmative Action Clout, Legal Times, July 30, 1984, at
34, col. 2.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 2581. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
16. 104 S. Ct. at 2581. The city also agreed to promote immediately thirteen
fire department employees and to provide back pay to eighty-one fire department employees. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Both the 1974 and the 1980 decrees provided that 50% of all job vacancies per year in the fire department would be filled with qualified black applicants. This
practice was to continue until the proportion of black employees in the fire department
required by the long-term goal of the decree was met. The 1980 decree further provided that the fire department would attempt to provide that 20% of promotions in
Against Existing Consent Decrees, 118

each job classification would go to blacks. Id.
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In 1981, in response to anticipated budget deficits, the city announced
layoffs of non-essential city employees. A last-hired, first-fired rule would be
used to determine which employees would be laid off."' Subsequent to the announcement, the plaintiff class sought and received a temporary restraining
order forbidding the city to lay off any black employee. The firefighters union
was then permitted to intervene in the suit. Following a hearing, the district
court found that the proposed layoff method had not been adopted with any
intent to discriminate.20 However, the court also found that the proposed layoffs would have a discriminatory effect and that the city's seniority system was
not bona fide. 21 The district court then entered an injunction to prevent the fire
department from applying its seniority system to the layoffs insofar as that
would decrease the percentage of blacks currently employed. 22 The city
presented a modified layoff plan aimed at protecting black employees which
the district court subsequently approved. Layoffs carried out pursuant to the
modified plan resulted in some nonminority employees
being laid off or de23
moted before minority employees with less seniority.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 24 Despite concluding that the city's seniority system was bona fide, 25 the court of
appeals decided that the district court's rulings were proper. It held that the
injunction was a modification of the 1980 consent decree that was permissible
to prevent the city from breaching its contract to increase substantially minority employment in supervisory positions. Alternatively, the court held that the
injunction properly modified the decree to prevent hardship, created by new
and unforeseen circumstances, to one of the parties to the decree. 26 Finally,
the court of appeals held that a court could issue orders overriding employee
rights in a bona fide seniority system. 27 The city and union appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.28
On the merits, the Court first found that the injunction was not justifiable
on the ground that the consent decree, as written, required the issuance of an
19. See supra note 8.
20. 104 S.Ct. at 2582.
21.

Id. The city's seniority system determined each employee's seniority by his

or her length of continuous service from the most recent date of permanent employment. Id. at 2581.
22. Id. at 2582.
23. Id. Due to the district court's injunction, three white employees who would
not otherwise have been laid off were laid off. It was unclear from the record how many
white employees were demoted as a result of the order. Id. at 2582 n.2.
24. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Firefighters Local, Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
25. Id. at 551 n.6.
26. Id. at 561-63.
27. Id. at 564.
28. Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority opinion, 104 S. Ct. at 2590,

and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2594. Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 2595.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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injunction overriding seniority.2 9 No provisions of the 1980 consent decree
dealt with layoffs or demotions. No suggestion of an intent to depart from the
city's existing seniority system could be intimated from a reading of the decree. The decree did state that it was not intended to conflict with the terms of
the 1974 consent decree and that decree "expressly anticipated that the city
would recognize seniority. ' 30 For these reasons, the Court said it could not be
argued that the decree explicitly contemplated the issuance of an injunction
overriding the existing seniority system, much less mandated it.31
The Court likewise concluded that the district court's injunction could not
be justified because it was necessary to carry out the purposes of the 1980
decree.3 2 The purpose of the decree was "to remedy the past hiring and promotion practices" of the fire department.3 3 The Court asserted that neither
this purpose nor the remedies adopted by the decree included the layoff of
white employees before less senior black employees. The Court added that it
was reasonable to believe that the remedy adopted by the decree would not go
beyond the limits of remedies available under Title VII, which protects bona
fide seniority systems. Therefore, the Court found it likely that the city believed its seniority system continued to be valid under the 1980 decree and
that it never intended to depart from that system.34
The Court then added that it was unlikely that the city would claim to
bargain away its seniority system since the union and nonminority employees
protected by that system were not parties to the decree. Thus, the Court concluded that the injunction was not required to enforce the express terms or
purposes of the 1980 consent decree.3"
29. Id. at 2583.
30. Id. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the case was not moot
because of the precedential effect of the injunction. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice White's first two reasons because the
injunction itself and any rulings on which it was based could both be eliminated by
vacating the judgment of the court of appeals and remanding with instructions to dismiss. Id. at 2596-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 2584. Justice O'Connor found the mootness claim unwarranted based
on this third reason. Id. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice White's final reason. Backpay and retroactive seniority could only
be awarded by the city. Since both the city and union were petitioners, rather than
adversaries in this suit, it involved the wrong adverse parties for the adjudication of
backpay and seniority claims by union members against the city. Id. at 2598 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2586.
33. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 575-76.
34. 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
35. Id. Justice Stevens also found that the express provisions and purposes of
the 1980 consent decree did not justify the injunction. However, he arrived at this
position on the grounds that the district court neither indicated that it was interpreting
the decree nor pointed out any portion of the decree which supported the issuance of
the injunction. Id. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with both
the Court's and Justice Stevens's reasoning. Id. at 2592-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun disagreed and concluded that the injunction was justifiable
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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After concluding that the city's seniority system was bona fide, 36 the
Court again turned its attention to the district court's injunction. The Court
discussed whether the injunction was permissible as a modification of the consent decree because of changed circumstances which, without the injunction,
would have undermined the gains in black employment under the decree and
subjected respondent plaintiff class to undue hardship.37 The court of appeals
had held that the injunction was a permissible modification of the consent decree, even though it conflicted with a bona fide seniority system. 38 The Supreme Court examined in turn each of the three alternative rationales offered
by the court of appeals to support its holding.
The majority opinion first considered a settlement theory. Under this theory, a consent decree which encroaches on a bona fide seniority system is permitted because of the strong public policy in favor of voluntary settlements in
Title VII suits.39 The Court rejected this theory as inapplicable because the
decree did not contain any voluntary agreement by the city to depart from the
40
seniority system.
The Court also rejected the rationale that the district court's injunction
was permissible because it required the city to do no more than that which it
could have done by establishing an affirmative action program of its own. This
rationale was found to be irrelevant because the modification of this decree
under a reasonable construction of the consent decree. First, the decree required "good
faith efforts on the part of the City" to meet the goals of increasing black representation in the fire department. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 576. Had respondent plaintiff class been
able to prove its charges at trial, a court could reasonably have concluded that the
proposed seniority based layoffs were a violation of that provision. 104 S. Ct. at 2603
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Second, the decree gave the district court authority to issue
"further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
decree." Stotts, 679 F.2d at 578. It was the obligation of the courts to give meaning to
this provision and it was reasonable for the district court to fulfill this obligation and to
carry out the broad "terms of the decree by issuing the injunction. 104 S. Ct. at 2603-04
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. The Court based its conclusion that the seniority system was bona fide on
Title VII and case law. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that use of a bona fide
seniority system by an employer shall not be an unlawful employment practice. See
supra note 9 for the text of section 703(h). In International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977), the Supreme Court held that routine application of a seniority system is permitted by section 703(h) absent proof of an intention to
discriminate. Since the district court itself concluded that the city adopted its seniority
based layoff plan without any intention to discriminate and since the city admitted no
intentional discrimination in its employment practices when it agreed to the consent
decree, Justice White concluded that any finding that the seniority based layoff plan
was not a bona fide application of the seniority system was improper. 104 S. Ct. at
2587.
37. See 104 S. Ct. at 2586-90.
38. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 551 n.6, 564.
39. Id. at 564-66.
40. 104 S.Ct. at 2587-88.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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was ordered over the city's objection.

669

1

The Court examined the third rationale at greater length. Under this theory, it was said that had this suit gone to trial and respondent proven its allegations, the district court, under authority of Title VII, could properly have
ordered an injunction overriding the fire department's seniority system. Since
an injunction overriding seniority would have been proper after a trial, the
district court also had authority to issue such an injunction to effectuate the
purpose of the consent decree. 42 The Court found this third rationale incorrect.
The Court concluded that two earlier decisions required it to hold that Title
VII does not empower a district court to issue orders overriding bona fide seniority systems to protect the jobs of minority employees in the face of pro3
posed layoffs.4
In Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo.,44 the Supreme Court held that
if an individual can prove that he was an actual victim of a discriminatory
employment practice, he may be awarded retroactive seniority from the date
that he would have been hired but for the discrimination. 45 In International

Brotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States,'4 the Supreme Court refined the
Franks decision by holding that only those individuals who prove that they
have been actual victims of discrimination may take advantage of the retroactive seniority remedy.47 In other words, merely being a member of a disadvantaged class is not sufficient to justify an award of retroactive seniority.
In Stotts, the district court made no finding that any individual in the
respondent plaintiff class was an actual victim of discrimination. 48 Therefore,
41. Id. at 2590. The Court reserved decision on whether a public employer can
unilaterally decide to disregard its seniority system when conducting layoffs in order t6
preserve a particular racial balance. Id. at 2590.
42. Id. at 2588.
43. Id. at 2588. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Neither of these
earlier cases dealt with the problem of layoffs presented in Stotts, but both provided
general rules on the availability of retroactive seniority as a remedy in employment
discrimination suits. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371; Franks,424 U.S. at 767-70. The
general rules on the availability of retroactive seniority are relevant because the Supreme Court apparently interpreted the district court's injunction as a generalized
grant of retroactive seniority to black firefighters as a class. If this type of retroactive
seniority did not comply with the guidelines on the use of that remedy laid down by the
Supreme Court, that Court would then be required to find that the district court lacked
the authority to grant such relief.
44. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
45. Id. at 767-70. The retroactive seniority is both of the competitive and benefit types. Id. at 766-69.
46. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
47. Id. at 371.
48. 104 S. Ct. at 2588. Justice Blackmun questioned the relevance of the district court's failure to find that any firefighter was an actual victim of discrimination.
He pointed out that this suit never did go to trial, and any findings the district court
may have made subsequent to a trial on the merits were unknown. Id. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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under the authority of Franks and Teamsters, the district court could not
properly have ordered protection of any black firefighter's job at the expense of
the job of a more senior white firefighter even if the suit had gone to trial.49
Justice White buttressed this conclusion with a discussion of the legislative history of section 706(g) of Title VII. Section 706(g) establishes the remedies a court may order in an employment discrimination case. 50 The legislative
history excerpted by Justice White indicated that Title VII was never intended
to authorize individual relief to anyone who was not an actual victim of
discrimination.51
Since the district court's injunction would not have been a permissible
Title VII remedy had the Stotts case gone to trial, the Supreme Court majority held that neither could it properly be ordered under the district court's
inherent power to modify a consent decree in order to prevent undue hardship
to one of the parties. 52 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
rejecting each alternative rationale that court used to justify its affirmance of
the district court.

53

49. Id. at 2588.
50. Section 706(g) of Title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate. . . . No order of the court shall require the admis-

sion or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment
to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended,
or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or
discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of 704(a) [2000e-3(a)] of this
title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
51. See 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. Typical of the excerpts is one from the remarks
made by Senator Humphrey about the effect of Title VII:
No court order can require hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership,
or payment of back pay for anyone who was not fired, refused employment or
advancement or admission to a union by an act of discrimination forbidden by
this title. This is stated expressly in the last sentence of Section [706 (g)]
. . . . [T]here is nothing in [Title VIII that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require . . . firing . . . of employees in order to

meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial balance.
Id. at 2589 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
52. Id. at 2590.
53. Id. The Court, in a footnote, also concluded that the injunction was not
justified under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 because the requirement for relief under
these sections of either proof or admission of intention to discriminate was not 'atisfied.
Id. at n.16.
One court has distinguished Stotts on the basis of this footnote. See NAACP v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8

8

1985]

Pritchett: Pritchett: No Retrenchment in Affirmative Action:

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion that the district
court's injunction was improper, either as an interpretation of the consent decree's express terms" or as a valid modification of the decree. 55 She emphasized that respondent plaintiff class could have chosen to establish that particular class members were victims of discrimination either by going to trial or in
the negotiations leading to the consent decree. The consent decree, however,
identified no individual victims of discrimination. By agreeing to this decree,
respondents waived any further relief other than enforcement of the decree.51
Justice O'Connor stated that granting respondents relief properly available
only to actual victims of discrimination after waiver of any further right to
establish individual victims would discourage voluntary settlement of employ57
ment discrimination suits.
Although he agreed in large part with the Court, Justice Stevens found
the Court's discussion of Title VII irrelevant. In his opinion, the only issue in
the case was whether the consent decree justified the district court's injunction. If the decree did justify the injunction it should have been upheld because the parties had agreed to the decree and were thereby bound. The question of whether a court could order a similar injunction at the conclusion of a
Title VII suit was thus irrelevant. 5 Using this analysis, Justice Stevens agreed
with the Court that the injunction was improper as a construction of the decree itself. 59
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984). In this case, plaintiffs charged that the city of Detroit violated affirmative duties imposed by prior findings of constitutional violations by conducting layoffs of police officers which undermined recent gains in black employment made under an affirmative action program. Id.
at 1197. The court held that the layoffs were a breach of the city's constitutional duties
because a court had found previously that the city had engaged in intentional discrimination. Id. at 1197, 1202-04; see also EEOC v. Local 638, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1466 (2d Cir. 1985) (Stotts distinguished in suit alleging only Title VII violations on ground that there had been a finding of intentional discrimination).
54. Id. at 2592-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 2593-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 574.
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also addressed Justice Blackmun's criticism that the majority opinion incorrectly treated the
injunction as permanent rather than preliminary and thus applied the wrong standard
of review. See infra note 62. She stated that the Court properly disapproved the preliminary injunction issued in Stotts as an abuse of discretion because respondents had
no chance of succeeding on the merits since they had waived any right to establish
individual victims of discrimination. 104 S. Ct. at 2594 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White defended his
Title VII analysis by stating that the court of appeals had relied on a Title VII analysis
and the Supreme Court had granted certiorari on that basis. Also, under System Fed'n
No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961), a "District Court's authority to adopt a
consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce,"
not by the consent of the parties to the decree. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9.
59. Id. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra note 38.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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Justice Stevens also found the injunction to be an improper modification
of the decree because the proposed layoffs were not a changed circumstance. It
was clear at the time the parties agreed to the 1980 consent decree that layoffs
would adversely affect black representation on the fire department. Thus, Justice Stevens determined that the district court had insufficient reason to invoke
its power to modify the consent decree.60
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented
from the majority's views. Although Justice Blackmun thought the case should
have been dismissed as moot,6" he noted what he considered to be errors in the
62
majority's reasoning.
The thrust of the dissent was that the Court ignored a substantial portion
of the body of employment discrimination law-that portion dealing with
race-conscious relief. Section 706(g) of Title VII allows a court to order "any
. . . equitable relief as the court deems appropriate" in employment discrimination suits. 63 While individual relief6 4 and race-conscious relief to a class65
60. Id. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring). Like the dissent, Justice Stevens considered the injunction a preliminary one. See infra note 62. However, since he found
that the district court was not justified in issuing the injunction either as a reasonable
construction of the consent decree or as a proper modification of the decree, he concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in entering the preliminary injunction. Id. a 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2596-2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 28.
62. See id. at 2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One such error asserted by Justice Blackmun was that the Court incorrectly treated the district court's injunction as a
permanent one. As the injunction was truly a preliminary injunction, according to Justice Blackmun, the Court, by determining the injunction's propriety, used the wrong
standard of review. The proper standard for review of a preliminary injunction is
whether the district court abused its discretion in entering the injunction. Id. at 260002 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice White asserted that he did apply the correct
standard of review because the district court did not apply the standards for determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue, but rather proceeded immediately to
determine whether it should modify the decree. Id. at 2585 n.8.
Justice Blackmun also asserted that the Court erred in defining the issue in the
suit as whether the district court had the power to order an injunction requiring the
layoff of white employees. The injunction, in reality, only prohibited layoffs which
would decrease the proportion of black employees in the fire department. Even if the
injunction did result in the layoff of white employees in violation of the seniority provision of the union contract, the existence of the injunction would not prevent the city
from being liable to those employees. Id. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. See supra note 50 for the text of section 706(g) of Title VII.
64. Individual relief is relief awarded to an individual because she has proven
she was an actual victim of discrimination. Awards to individuals of back pay, retroactive seniority, and promotions are examples of individual relief. Id. at 2605-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Justice Blackmun described race-conscious relief as follows:
The purpose of such relief is not to make whole any particular individual, but
rather to remedy the present class-wide effects of past discrimination or to
prevent similar discrimination in the future . . . . The distinguishing feature
of race-conscious relief is that no individual member of the disadvantaged
class has a claim to it, and individual beneficiaries of the relief need not show
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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have been distinguished by courts, both types of relief have been deemed appropriate remedies under section 706(g) in certain circumstances. 6 The majority opinion, by discussing only individual relief, failed to consider the propriety of the district court's injunction as an application of race-conscious
relief.67 Justice Blackmun found that the injunction was a proper exercise of
the district court's power to order race-conscious relief because it protected
blacks as a class, not as individuals. The city was not prevented from laying off
any individual black employee as long as the proportion of black employees in
the fire department did not decline. 8 Justice Blackmun concluded that, because the Court failed to acknowledge the existence of race-conscious relief, it
seemed clear that the Court's holding meant "that the race-conscious relief
ordered in these cases was broader than necessary, not that race-conscious re68'
lief is never appropriate under Title VII.
The dissent in Stotts voiced concern that the Court had departed from
precedent first, in not finding the case moot,70 and second, in not recognizing
the existence of the availability of race-conscious relief under Title VII when
it did address the merits. The concern was justified on the mootness point. In
the previous term, the Court had considered a case substantially similar to
that they were themselves victims of the discrimination for which the relief
was granted.
Id. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2605-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The courts of appeal are in unanimous agreement that race-conscious relief can be an appropriate remedy. 104 S. Ct. at
2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d
1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); EEOC v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1363-66 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. IBEW, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
943 (1970); United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544,
553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, 625 F.2d 918, 944 (10th Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Justice Blackmun also found tacit approval of the use of race-conscious relief by
courts in the legislative history of section 706(g). See 104 S.Ct. at 2608-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice White challenged the dissent's interpretation of this legislative history. See id. at 2590 n.15.
67. Justice Blackmun found the Court's reliance on Teamsters irrelevant because that case involved only the problems and nature of appropriate individual relief.
The Court in Teamsters did not consider race-conscious relief because all class-wide
claims were settled before the Court heard the case. 104 S.Ct. at 2608 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
68. Id. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2610 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although Justice Blackmun dissented, he did not think the district court's injunction necessarily was proper. Id.
70. See supra note 28.
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Stotts which it vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness.7 1 The
Court should have faced its reversal from this position squarely, 72 but instead
it ignored the earlier decision entirely.73
The dissent was concerned also over the failure of the Court to recognize
the existence of race-conscious relief. Justice Blackmun apparently suspected
that the Court was signaling an eventual decision that race-conscious relief is
not proper as a Title VII remedy regardless of whether there is a conflicting
seniority system.7 4 One commentator has stated explicitly that the Stotts decision evidences a move by the Court toward this position. 5 His reasoning is
that the Court's opinion in Stotts,
is based in significant part on the conclusion that Congress did not intend for
71. See Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 103
S. Ct. 2076 (1983). The District Court for the District of Massachusetts enjoined the
city of Boston from laying off police officers and firefighters in any manner which
would reduce the proportion of minorities in those occupations. This injunction interfered with the operation of Massachusetts's statutory last hired, first fired system for
public employee layoffs. The court of appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the state enacted
legislation which provided Boston with revenue and required the rehire of all laid off
police officers and firefighters. The legislation also prohibitted future layoffs of police
officers and firefighters for fiscal reasons and required minimum staffing levels to be
maintained in the police and fire departments through June 30, 1983. The Supreme
Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded for consideration of mootness. Id. at 2076.
In both Stotts and Boston Firefighters the city rehired the laid off employees
before the case reached the Supreme Court. Apparently the Boston employees had
more protection from future layoffs than did the Memphis firefighters since Massachusetts enacted legislation protecting against future layoffs. However, the legislation required the minimum staffing levels only until June 30, 1983, and secured employees
against layoffs only for fiscal reasons. See id. Moreover, it was not inconceivable that
Boston's fiscal woes would continue, that the state would tire of pumping funds into
Boston to secure the jobs, and that the legislation would be repealed. Therefore, the
chance that the injunction would control future layoffs was just as existent in Boston
Firefightersas in Stotts. Even if the existence of the legislation in Boston Firefighters
could be found to be a distinguishing factor, the Boston employees, no less than the
Memphis firefighters had claims against the city for back pay and lost seniority. See
104 S.Ct. at 2584.
72. The Court could have justified its change in position under a "capable of
repetition, yet evading review theory." For a discussion of this theory, see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973). Such a theory could be invoked on three grounds: injunctions preventing the operation of seniority systems in determining layoff order would
likely occur again; review of the injunctions would be nearly impossible because the
rehire of those laid off would moot the cases; and such rehire was likely before the case
could reach the Supreme Court. To support its assertions of the likelihood of injunctions suspending operation of seniority systems and of the rapid rehire of those laid off,
the Court could point out that two such cases had arrived at the Court in the past two
years. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Boston Firefighters,103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983).
73. Curiously, the dissent did not cite the earlier decision either.
74. See 104 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Powers, supra note 14, at 34, col. 2; see also Campaign Against Existing
Consent Decrees, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 182, 183 (1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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§ 706(g) [of Title VII] to empower courts to order race-conscious action for

those not identified as victims of discrimination. Since § 706(g) applies to
situations not involving seniority as well as those that do, the five justices who
joined in the
opinion probably will give similarly broad application to this
76

conclusion.

Race-conscious relief cannot be written off this quickly. There is a broad
statement in the Court's opinion that the policy behind section 706(g) "is to
provide make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal
discrimination.17 7 This statement apparently means that courts may not rely
on Title VII to award relief to anyone who has not shown she was an actual
victim of discrimination. Under this interpretation, race-conscious relief would
be impermissible. However, the Court's statement is susceptible to another interpretation. The dissent states that the purpose of race-conscious relief "is not
to make whole any particular individual.178 This indicates that race-conscious
relief and make-whole relief are not the same and that one is not a sub-class of
the other. Thus, the Court's statement about the availability of make-whole
relief under Title VII has little to do with the availability of race-conscious
relief. The majority opinion of the Court did not even discuss race-conscious
relief. The failure of the Court to recognize the existence of race-conscious
relief could mean that the Court found race-conscious relief impermissible in
all instances. But since it did not explicitly reject the propriety of race-conscious relief, the Court's non-recognition of such relief could just as easily
mean that the Court merely found it inapplicable in this case.
Also, one court, in a decision subsequent to Stotts, distinguished between
make-whole and prospective relief.79 Since court-ordered affirmative action
programs favoring minorities with respect to new hires and promotions are
examples of prospective relief, the Stotts majority's statement about the availability of make-whole relief is inapplicable to race-conscious relief that favors
minorities for hiring and promotion. 0 Thus, the door remains open for a majority of the Supreme Court to recognize the validity of race-conscious relief in
contexts other than the one presented by Stotts.
In addition, the Court's opinion speaks of balancing the equities in cases
of employment discrimination." There is a strong policy consideration against
applying race-conscious relief in layoff cases like Stotts in that innocent
nonminority employees would lose their jobs if such relief is applied." No similar policy consideration exists in other potential applications of race-conscious
76. Powers, supra note 14, at 34, col. 2.
77. 104 S. Ct. at 2589.
78. Id. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. See EEOC v. Local 538, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1477 (2d
Cir. 1985).

80. Id. at 1477.
81. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
82. See, e.g., id. at 2586; Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester
Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
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relief.83 If the weight of harm to innocent employees is removed from the
scale, the Court could find the equities tilting the balance toward the applica84
tion of race-conscious relief.
Moreover, a Supreme Court holding that race-conscious relief is not
proper would be contrary to the strong current of decisions of the courts of
appeal. Each of the courts of appeal has found that race-conscious relief can
83. See Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1431,
1435 (6th Cir. 1985); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1093-94 (D.D.C. 1985).
In the case of new hires, a non-minority applicant has no more right to be hired than
an equally qualified minority applicant since neither obtains a legitimate interest in the
job until hired. See Vanguards, 36 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1435; Hammon,
606 F. Supp. at 1092-93. Courts have ordered race-conscious remedies which favored
the hiring of miniorities. See, e.g., Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d
482, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1981); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017,
1026-28 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). Similarly, courts have upheld race-conscious remedies which favored minorities for union membership. See, e.g.,
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1974).
Race-conscious promotion plans occupy a middle ground between plans for new
hires and layoffs. In favoring minorities for promotion, the non-minorities are in no
danger of losing their existing jobs, and therefore their livelihood. But, even though a
minority and a non-minority have no legitimate interest in the higher job until actually
promoted, see Vanguards, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1435, a non-minority
with ten years seniority does have a justifiable expectation to be promoted before a
minority with five years seniority, see Hammon, 606 F. Supp. at 1098. Courts have
upheld race-conscious remedies which favored minorities for promotion. See, e.g.,
Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). In EEOC v. American TeL & TeL Co.,
the court refused to distinguish between race-conscious remedies applied to new hires
and those remedies applied to promotions. 556 F.2d at 177. In Stotts, however, the
Supreme Court stated that it was "inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the
benefits of his seniority in order to provide a remedy" in employment discrimination
suits. 104 S. Ct. at 2586. This statement indicates race-conscious remedies applied to
new hires are more likely to pass muster than race-conscious remedies applied to promotions since promotions are often based, at least in part, on seniority. See also Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082 (D.D.C. 1985) (court upheld hiring provisions of
employer's voluntary affirmative action plan, but rejected promotion aspects of the
plan).
84. In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), Justice Powell
stated that application of retroactive seniority as a remedy in employment discrimination cases would disadvantage innocent employees. Id. at 788-89 (Powell, J., concurring
and dissenting). Yet the majority found retroactive seniority to be a permissible remedy. Id. at 767-70. The Court could as easily find that disadvantages to non-minority
applicants inherent in a race-conscious hiring plan are an unfortunate but necessary
side effect of a permissible judicial attempt to redress past discrimination. See Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1431 (6th Cir. 1985)
(affirmative action plan upheld; Stotts distinguished because plan did not interfere with
existing seniority system); EEOC v. Local 638, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466
(2d Cir. 1985) (affirmative action plan upheld; Stotts distinguished because plan did
not conflict with any seniority rights).
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be an appropriate remedy under section 706(g).
not treat this unanimity lightly.

5

The Supreme Court should

Further, as the dissent noted,88 the author of the Stotts opinion, Justice

White, has himself joined in an opinion which stated: "Executive, judicial, and
congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively
estab87
lished that the Title did not bar the remedial use of race.
Finally, whether the Supreme Court in Stotts is signaling a rejection of
court-ordered, race-conscious relief, the Court's decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber"8 is unaffected by Stotts. In Weber, the Court held that raceconscious affirmative action plans voluntarily implemented by private parties
are permissible under Title VII.8 9 Thus, the Stotts decision leaves unblocked a
huge avenue for race-conscious affirmative action plans. 0
Whatever the long-term implications of the Stotts decision, the Stotts result complies with the bulk of previous decisions addressing the question of
circumventing seniority to realign the burdens of a layoff between minorities
and nonminorities. While the Supreme Court had never addressed the merits
85. 104 S.Ct. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 67.
86. See 104 S.Ct. at 2610 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 353 n.28 (1978)
(opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
88. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
89. Id. at 207-08. Also, the Court in Stotts specifically left open the question of
whether a public employer can unilaterally adopt an affirmative action program which
modified the operation of a seniority system. 104 S.Ct. at 2590.
90. At least five courts have already distinguished Stotts on this ground. See
Vanguards, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1431 (6th Cir. 1985) (city's affirmative
action promotion plan valid under Weber in that it was voluntarily adopted; Stotts
distinguished because the plan did not interfere with the existing seniority system and
because the city had voluntarily agreed to the plan); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984) (provision in collective bargaining agreement between
teachers union and board of education which provided that in the event of layoffs there
would be no reduction in proportion of minority teachers upheld under Weber, Stotts
distinguished because it was said not to apply to court-imposed affirmative action
plans), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894
(3d Cir. 1984) (provision in collective bargaining agreement between teachers union
and school district which required maintaining a faculty ratio at each school of between 75% and 125% of the system-wide proportions of black and white teachers valid
under Weber; Stotts distinguished because the union and school district voluntarily
agreed to the provision); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082 (D. D.C. 1985) (hiring
provisions of city's voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan upheld under Weber,
Stotts distinguished because job applicants were not deprived of any vested seniority
rights; promotion aspects of plan rejected because interests of non-minorities were unnecessarily trammeled in that employees have legitimate expectations of equal opportunity to advance); Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (provision in collective bargaining agreement between teachers union
and school board which provided that in the event of layoffs there would be no reduction in proportion of minority teachers upheld under Weber; Stotts distinguished because it was said to apply only to court imposed affirmative action plans).
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of this question before Stotts,91 several lower courts have had the opportunity
to consider it.
Most courts of appeal have reached the same result that the Supreme
Court reached in Stotts, i.e., that it is generally improper for a court to issue
orders which result in nonminority employees being laid off before less senior
minority employees in order to maintain a particular proportion of minority
employees.9 2 Several courts of appeal tempered this general holding, just as
the Supreme Court tempered its general holding in Stotts, by stating that
those minorities who could prove that they were actual victims of discrimination would be provided with retroactive seniority. 3 The district courts that
have addressed the issue have, more often than not, found that orders which
result in layoffs of nonminority employees before less senior minority employees can be an appropriate remedy, even where no actual victims of discrimination have been determined.9 4 The district courts, though, have often been
91. On the two occasions in which cases hinging on this question reached the
Court, the lower court decisions were vacated and remanded. See Boston Firefighters
Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983) (lower court
told to consider mootness issue); EEOC v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 425 U.S.
987 (1976) (lower court told to reevaluate decision in light of Franks).
92. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 764-65 (6th Cir.
1983); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1978); Southbridge Plastics
Div., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 565 F.2d 913,
916-17 (5th Cir. 1978); Schaefer v. Tannian, 538 F.2d 1234, 1236 (6th Cir. 1976);
Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1976); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534
F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Watkins v. United
Steel Workers, Local No. 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 703 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 425 U.S. 987, on remand
sub nom. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327, IBEW, 542 F.2d 8, 10
(3d Cir. 1976) (court readopted its original opinion nearly in its entirety on remand);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). Contra Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher,
679 F.2d 965, 973 (lst Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Boston Firefighters Union, Local
718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d
551, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1981).
93. See Youngblood, 568 F.2d at 508; Southbridge, 565 F.2d at 916-17; Jersey,
542 F.2d at 11; Schaefer, 538 F.2d at 1236; Chance, 534 F.2d at 1007; Acha, 531 F.2d
at 654, 656. The Waters and Watkins decisions did not make an exception to their
general holding for those who could prove they were actual victims of discrimination,
but they were decided prior to Franks.
94. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 526 F. Supp. 131, 135 (W.D. Mich.
1981), vacated, 706 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1983); Castro v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. 873,
877 (D. Mass. 1981), affid sub nom. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d
965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston
Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983); Brown v. Neeb, 523 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D.
Ohio 1980), afJ'd, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 10
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1023, 1025-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 993 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136,
1150 (E.D. Mich. 1975), modified, 538 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1976) (remanded for further consideration in light of Franks); EEOC v. International Union of Elevator Conhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/8
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reversed.95
The factual situations in many of these layoff cases are very similar. Typically, females or minorities are suing their employer or union or both on the
ground that seniority based layoffs provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and union or by statute for public employees
violate either Title VII or the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes or both,
in that they perpetuate past discrimination.9 6 Although there may be no discrimination in present hiring practices, plaintiffs argue, past discriminatory
hiring practices have assured that women or minorities do not have sufficient
seniority to withstand layoffs.97
This type of situation provides a less compelling reason for courts to enjoin the operation of the seniority system than existed in Stotts because in
Stotts there was the added factor that the consent decree arguably overrode
the existing seniority system. The district courts are split in their decisions of
these cases; some have rejected plaintiffs' claims99 while others have accepted
structors, Local Union No. 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aridsub nom.
United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5, 538
F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Southbridge Plastics Div., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759,
Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 403 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd,
565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327,
IBEW, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 690, 693 (D.N.J. 1974) (oral opinion), vacated, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co., 425 U.S. 987, on remand sub nom. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Local Union 327, IBEW, 542 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1976) (court substantially readopted
original opinion on remand); Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
614, 616 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 234, 236 (N.D. Ill. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1974) (reversed portion of decision overriding seniority system), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 997 (1976). Contra Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 567 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D. Mass.
1983), afj'd, 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138,
1188 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (district court's decision
to enforce seniority system affirmed); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 145, 148 (S.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978); Payne v.
Travenol Laboratories, 416 F. Supp. 248, 264-65 (N.D. Miss. 1976), modified, 565
F.2d 895 (5th Cir.) (district court's decision to enforce seniority system affirmed), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Hinton v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 412 F. Supp. 625,
629 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Acha v. Beame, 401 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
rev'd, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976) (district court reversed because it had not allowed
individuals to show that they had been actual victims of discrimination); Jones v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 913, 914 (N.D. Cal.
1975), aft'd, 536 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
95. See supra note 94.
96. See Hinton, 412 F. Supp. at 626; Acha, 401 F. Supp. at 816-17; Schaefer,
394 F. Supp. at 1137-38; Jones, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 913; Loy, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615-16; Waters, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 23536.
97. See cases cited supra note 96.
98. See Hinton, 412 F. Supp. at 629; Acha, 401 F. Supp. at 817; Jones, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 914.
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plaintiffs' arguments and ordered that the seniority system at least partially be
disregarded for purposes of layoffs.9 9 Those district court decisions which have
held that the seniority system must be overridden usually have been either
remanded for further consideration or reversed.100 The courts of appeal have
predominantly upheld the seniority systems, rejecting plaintiffs' claims in these
cases, usually on the ground that Title VII authorizes relief only for actual
victims of discrimination. 10 1
Not all the decisions dealing with the layoff problem conform with this
basic fact pattern. One case involved a variation in the legal basis for the
challenge of the collective bargaining agreement's seniority based lay-off system. 10 2 Instead of a charge that seniority based lay-offs would violate Title VII
or the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Statutes, it was argued in this case
that the lay-off of any black teacher in the public school district should be
enjoined because that would conflict with previous court orders to the school to
achieve a particular ratio of black teachers. Those previous orders were made
in a desegregation suit and were based on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.10 3 The district court ordered that all tenured black
teachers who had been laid off be reinstated and that no tenured black teacher
be laid off until the district achieved its goal of a twenty percent black teaching staff.104 The court of appeals, in vacating the district court's decision, held
that seniority rights may not be nullified unless necessary to vindicate constitutional rights, and that plaintiffs had failed to show the necessity of prohibiting
the layoff of black teachers. 10 5
In a second variation of the basic fact pattern, the district court affirmatively orders that minority employees be rehired (thus possibly displacing existing nonminority employees) or that nonminority employees be laid off
before less senior minority employees. In the more typical case, the court orders that layoffs are not to reduce the proportion of minority employees. 10 As
99. See Schaefer, 394 F. Supp. at 1150; Loy, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 617; Waters, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 236.
100. See supra note 94.
101. See Schaefer, 538 F.2d at 1236; Acha, 531 F.2d at 654, 656; Waters, 502

F.2d at 1320. In light of the Franks decision, the Schaefer court remanded for determinations of actual victims of discrimination, who would then receive retroactive seniority. Those who received retroactive seniority would thereby receive as much insulation from layoffs as this constructive seniority provided. See 538 F.2d at 1236. The

Acha court did the same thing before the Franks decision. See 531 F.2d at 654, 656.
102. See Oliver, 526 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Mich. 1981), vacated, 706 F.2d 757
(6th Cir. 1983).

103. Oliver, 706 F.2d at 785.
104. Oliver, 526 F. Supp. at 135.

105. Oliver, 706 F.2d at 764-65.
106. See Chance, 10 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1026 (district court or-

dered layoffs to be conducted in accordance with a formula imposing racial quotas);

Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local No. 2369, 8 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
729, 730-31 (E.D. La. 1974) (district court ordered rehire of a sufficient number of

blacks to achieve black-white ratio that existed before layoffs), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th
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would be expected, the affirmative orders are more often reversed by the
courts of appeal than the typical "no reduction of proportion" order.'0 7
In a third variation, the employees are covered by no guarantee that layoffs will be conducted in reverse order of seniority. In Stotts, the seniority
system implied from the 1974 consent decree was a major factor strengthening
the Supreme Court's ruling that the order to disregard seniority in the Memphis layoffs was improper. 108 Where no formal seniority system exists, the situation is more favorable for those desiring to prevent seniority based layoffs.
This is because no concrete contractual right which ensures seniority based
layoffs can be set against the plaintiffs' claim of discrimination, and because
the protection section 703(h) of Title VII applies to bona fide seniority systems
and is probably less likely to be found applicable where there is no formal
seniority system. 0 9 Therefore, in cases where no formal seniority system exists, there is less to impede a court that wants to remedy a situation that is
discriminatory in effect. However, in these circumstances the courts generally
have allowed employers to conduct layoffs in accordance with informal seniority policies.' 0 One district court, in an analogous situation, upheld an affirmaCir. 1975). In Watkins, the district court also ordered that no white employee be laid
off to make places for the rehired black employees. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
731. Intuitively, an order to rehire many employees combined with an order to lay off
no one to make room for the returning employees would seem to be a certain recipe for
driving a company into bankruptcy by overburdening the payroll. However, two commentators have made a convincing argument that, in many cases, companies conduct
layoffs to maximize profits rather than to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, this combination of
orders often would not push a company beyond the brink, but rather would merely
decrease profits. Such orders would therefore be no more difficult to bear than an ordinary money judgment against the company. Burke & Chase, Resolving the Seniority!
Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 81, 100-06 (1978).
107. See Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local No. 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1975). The Watkins court stated:
[R]egardless of an earlier history of employment discrimination, when present
hiring practices are nondiscriminatory and have been for over ten years, an
employer's use of a long established seniority system for determining who will
be laid-off . . , adopted without intent to discriminate, is not a violation of
Title VII or § 1981, even though the use of the seniority system results in the
discharge of more blacks than whites to the point of eliminating blacks from
the work force, where the individual employees who suffer layoff under the
system have not themselves been the subject of prior employment
discrimination.
Id. at 44-45; see also Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976)
(order requiring layoffs based on quotas determined to be a form of reverse discrimination because it was not designed to benefit actual victims of discrimination), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
108. See 104 S.Ct. at 2586.
109. See supra note 10 for the text of § 703(h) of Title VII.
110. See Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 567 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D. Mass. 1983)
(seniority based layoff executed without racial bias even though blacks were more
heavily affected than whites), af'd, 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984); Croker v. Boeing
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tive action program adopted as part of the collective bargaining union agreement which modified the pre-existing seniority system.111 The court of appeals
affirmed, stating that seniority is an economic right which unions may elect to
11 2

bargain away.

The final variation occurs where either a conciliation agreement between
the EEOC and an employer or a consent decree between minority employees
and an employer contradicts, or arguably contradicts, the seniority based layoff requirement of the collective bargaining agreement or a state statute. The
Stotts case involved a situation similar to this in that the 1980 consent decree
arguably contradicted the 1974 consent decree which recognized the seniority
system. At least five cases have involved whether a conciliation agreement or a
consent decree takes precedence over a seniority based lay-off system required
by a collective bargaining agreement or a state statute in the event of contradictory provisions.11 3
In four of these cases the consent decree or conciliation agreement called
Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (seniority based layoffs, both of those
employees covered by a formal seniority system and those not so covered, not violative
of Title VII), modified, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (district court's holding on seniority system affirmed); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 416 F. Supp. 248, 264-65 (N.D.
Miss. 1976) (seniority based layoffs approved, but actual victims of company's past
discriminatory hiring practices entitled to some degree of relief from layoffs), modified,
565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.) (district court's decision to enforce seniority system affirmed),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978). Contra EEOC v. International Union of Elevator
Constructors, Local Union No. 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (union
enjoined from exhorting employers to favor senior members when making layoff decisions and from enforcing provision in standard agreement requiring that probationary
workers be laid off before non-probationary workers belonging to other union locals),
afl'd sub nom. United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local
Union No. 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
111. See Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F. Supp. 539, 550 (D. Nev. 1979),
aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
112. 658 F.2d at 707. The Tangren court relied substantially upon United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In a footnote the court also stated that a
racially preferential affirmative action program imposed unilaterally by the employer
would not violate the law, provided the plan does not conflict with a collective bargaining agreement.
113. See Castro v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981), affd sub nom.
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom.
Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076
(1983); Brown v. Neeb, 523 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ohio 1980), affd, 644 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1981); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 14 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 145 (S.D. Ohio
1976), affid, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978); Southbridge Plastics Div., W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 403 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D.
Miss. 1975), rev'd, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Local Union 327, IBEW, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 690, 693 (D.N.J. 1974) (oral
opinion), vacated, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co., 425 U.S. 987, on remand sum nom. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Local Union 327, IBEW, 542 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1976) (court readopted its
original opinion nearly in its entirety on remand).
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for the employer to increase the percentage of minority employees, but contained no provisions dealing with the order of lay-offs."' The district court in
Youngblood v. Dalzell held that the consent decree could not be construed to
foreclose the city from conducting seniority based layoffs.11 5 The court of appeals, after pointing out that the city had specifically denied committing any
employment discrimination in the consent decree and that no contentions were
presented that the layoffs were intentionally discriminatory, affirmed the district court's decision because the consent decree did not commit the city to any
11 6
policy with respect to layoffs.
In two of the other cases, the district court held that the consent decrees
gave the district court the power to order the city not to conduct layoffs which
would reduce the percentage of minority employees. 11 7 In both cases the court
of appeals affirmed, in NAACP v. Beecher on the ground that new and unforeseeable circumstances allowed such a modification of the consent decree l18 and
in Brown v. Neeb on the ground that the consent decree required affirmative
action, not negative aciton, and that the decree specifically allowed the entry
of orders to effectuate its provisions.119 Both courts of appeal distinguished the
previous case on several grounds. First, in the previous case, the city denied
prior discrimination in the consent decree. In these two cases, there was no
such exculpatory language in the consent decrees.1 20 Second, there had been
no finding of prior discrimination in the previous case, while in these cases the
decrees were entered upon "capitulation to judicial findings of past discrimination. ' 21 Third, language was used in the consent decrees of these two cases
which justified the conclusion that the cities were placed under an affirmative
duty to achieve a proportion of minority employees approximately equal to the
proportion of minorities in the general population. The language of the consent
decree in the previous case placed no such affirmative duty on the city.1 22
114. See Beecher, 679 F.2d at 966; Brown, 644 F.2d at 553; Youngblood, 568
F.2d at 506-07; Jersey Cent., 542 F.2d at 10 (remanded for determination of actual
victims of discrimination who would then be entitled to retroactive seniority).
115. Youngblood, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 148.
116. Id. at 508.
117. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. at 877; Brown, 522 F. Supp. at 6.
118. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 973.
119. Brown, 644 F.2d at 558.
120. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 973; Brown, 644 F.2d at 561.
121. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 973; Brown, 644 F.2d at 561-62.
122. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 973; Brown, 644 F.2d at 561. Under these three distinctions, Stotts falls closer to the previous case, Youngblood, which allowed seniority
based layoffs than to the later two cases, Beecher and Brown, which did not. In the
Stotts consent decrees, the city refused to admit any prior discrimination. See 679 F.2d
at 574, 570. Moreover, there was no judicial finding of prior discrimination in Stotts.
See 679 F.2d at 574. The provision in the Stotts 1974 consent decree which states that
the "purpose of this consent decree is to insure . . . that any disadvantage to blacks
and women which may have resulted from past discrimination is remedied," 679 F.2d
at 571, could be construed as placing the city under an affirmative duty to bring the
proportion of minority employees into line with the proportion of minorities in the genPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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In Jersey Central-Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, the district court held
that the conciliation decree superseded the seniority system and that layoffs
had to be conducted so as not to reduce the percentage of minority employees. 2 The court of appeals vacated the judgment because it found that the
conciliation agreement and the collective bargaining agreement did not conflict. The court determined that lay-offs in reverse order of seniority would not
contravene the provision of the conciliation agreement which called for in124
creasing the percentage of minority employees through new hires.
A different situation was involved in Southbridge Plastics Division v. InternationalUnion of Rubber Workers. In this case the conciliation agreement
specifically provided for quota-based layoffs to prevent any reduction in the
percentage of women employees,' 125 while the collective bargaining agreement
provided for seniority based layoffs.' 28 The district court held that the concilia27
tion agreement took precedence over the collective bargaining agreement.1
The court of appeals, in reversing the district court, determined that layoffs
should be conducted under the seniority system established by the collective
bargaining agreement. The court held that agreements between management
and labor can be overturned on a Title VII challenge only to the extent required to comply with that statute. Citing International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 28 the court stated that, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose, section 703(h) of Title VII protects a seniority system
from Title VII attack. Since there was no showing of discriminatory purpose
in this seniority system, its destruction, as authorized by the conciliation
29
agreement, could not be permitted.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Supreme Court's holding in Stotts
is not a departure from precedent or from the trend in lower federal courts.
Rather, the Stotts decision is more a culmination of a visible trend in the
eral population. However, this provision does not seem to place as strong an affirmative
duty on the city to end the disproportionately low minority representation among employees as the provision in Brown in which the city committed itself "to erase any
vestige of past employment discrimination." Brown, 644 F.2d at 554.
123. Jersey Cent., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 693.
124. 542 F.2d at 10 n.2 (remanded for determination of actual victims to discrimination who would then be entitled to retroactive seniority).
125. Southbridge, 565 F.2d at 915.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 433 U.S. 324 (1977).
129. Southbridge, 565 F.2d at 915-17 (court further held that if individual employees could prove that they were actual victims of discrimination they would be entitled to retroactive seniority). The parties in Southbridge were later involved in a suit
concerning whether the company was liable for backpay to employees laid off pursuant
to the consent decree who would not have been laid off under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of
United Rubber Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983). The Supreme Court held that the
company's conflicting obligations were a dilemma of its own making and upheld awards
of backpay to the employees. Id. at 2184.
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lower courts. This trend is not toward the erosion of race-conscious relief, and
thus of affirmative action. Stotts and the other cases discussed above dealt
only with the question of layoffs. There are real distinctions between the application of race-conscious relief in the layoff situation and in other situations in
which affirmative action plans have been ordered. For example, affirmative action programs dealing with hiring practices do not suffer from the inequities
inherent in requiring layoffs to be conducted under a race- or sex-conscious
plan. One job applicant has no more right to be hired than another equally
30
qualified applicant since neither obtains an interest in the job until hired.1
On the other hand, although courts have stated that seniority rights are not
32
131
vested property rights, they are viewed by the courts as very important.1
Certainly no one will deny that seniority rights give rise to an expectancy in
the employee that she will not be laid off before a less senior employee. Further, the nonminority employees are, themselves, innocent of any employment33
discrimination. The employer is the one who made the hiring decisions.
Therefore, for a court to nullify a seniority system by requiring that any layoffs be conducted so that the percentage of minorities or women does not decline "would be tantamount to shackling [innocent nonminority] employees
with a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their emantagonism will be bred between miployer. '' "3 4 Even worse, resentment and
5
nority and nonminority employees."1
130. See Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1431,
1435 (6th Cir. 1985); Hammon v. Barry, 605 F. Supp. 1082, 1092-93 (D.D.C. 1985).
131. See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 658 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977) (speaks of vested seniority rights); Hammon v.
Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (D.D.C. 1985) (same).
132. See, e.g., Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2583-84 n.4.
133. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d
1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
134. Id. Since non-minority employees are innocent of employment discrimination and the minority employees have been historically discriminated against, why
should either be laid off? The employer who maintained discriminatory employment
practices should bear the burden of its past discrimination. Two commentators have
made a strong case for requiring the employer to keep both the minority and the nonminority employees on its payroll. Burke & Chase, Resolving the Seniority/Minority
Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81
(1978). The district court in Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local No. 2369, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 729, 730-31 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975), did place the burden on the employer when it both ordered the recall of laid off
black employees and enjoined the employer from laying off white employees to make
room for the returning blacks. The court of appeals, however, reversed. See 516 F.2d at
44-45.
135. See Burke & Chase, supra note 134, at 93-95; Wines, Seniority, Recession,
and Affirmative Action: The Challengefor Collective Bargaining,20 Am. Bus. L.J. 37,
43 (1982). One could argue equally vigorously that unencumbered operation of a seniority system would cause antagonism and resentment as minority employees see nonminority employees retaining their jobs even though hired after the minority employees
sought jobs and were rejected because of the employer's former discriminatory hiring
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The Stotts Court apparently recognizes the distinctions between the application of race-conscious relief to layoffs and to new hires given its acceptance of a balancing of equities approach. 136 The Stotts decision made clear the
Supreme Court's position that the equities in the layoff cases do not justify
race-conscious relief. On the other hand, the existing equities in the new hires
case do seem to justify race-conscious relief from the courts. It is evident that
these two positions can co-exist from the decisions of the courts of appeal.
which refuse to modify seniority systems in the layoff cases, even though all
the circuits accept the appropriateness of race-conscious relief in some circumstances. Thus, the Stotts decision placed a boundary only upon the reach of
race-conscious remedies. It is a boundary that has seldom before been crossed
by affirmative action plans anyway. In areas other than layoff cases, race-conscious relief should remain valid.
MICHAEL PRITCHETT

practices. But in this case the minority worker has a solution. Under Franks, she may
be awarded retroactive seniority upon a showing that she was an actual victim of discrimination. See 424 U.S. at 767-70. Given that the burden of proof is set at a level to
make this remedy an effective one for minorities, antagonism between minorities and
non-minorities caused by a freely operating seniority system will be minimized.
136. See 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
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